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What changes a population's fertility? What keeps it constant? 
We have not arrived at a simple reply, a single explanatory model, or 
even at a standard list of determinants. Yet the net effect of.the 
explorations in this book is to narrow considerably the range of 
plausible explanations, as compared with those which are being seriously 
proposed today. That is true on-the side of general explanations: our 
papers raise significant doubts concerning the whole range of arguments 
in which the diffusion of new contraceptive aspirations, techniques and 
information is the major mechanism of fertility change, and provide 
strong support for arguments balancing the costs of contraception.and 
child care against: the changing life chances of children. It is,also 
- - .  
true on the historical side: the papers weigh against .the interpre-, 
tation of fertility changes in Europe and America as resulting from 
changing enthusiasm for children and: from family life, while calling 
attention to a variety of social arrangements which maintained some sort 
of.balance between the incentives and opportunities to marry and have 
_ # '  - 
children,'on the one hand, and the carrying capacity of the environment, 
on the other. The book's tendency, then, runs against Malthusian and 
ideological technological theories; it runs toward theories emphasizing 
the rational pursuit of long-run individual, household, family or 
community objectives. 
Before discussing the general questions and~conclusions which 
emerge from the entire set of papers, let me review the character. of 
each one separately. 
Richard Easterlin, "The Economics and Sociolopy of Fertility". 
Easterlin integrates an analysis of the determinants of desired number 
of children with an analysis of the extent and effectiveness of.fertility 
control. The first follows the main lines of recent economic writing 
on fertility, to which Easterlin himself has been a significant con- 
tributor. The second is more adventurous, for it places a variety of 
insights and arguments from sociology and other disciplines within a 
formal economic framework. Easterlin performs the synthesis by 
postulating a natural fertility level which is more or less known and 
more or less fixed over the span of a household's fertility decisions, 
then treating the demand for fertility regulation as a function of its 
cost and of the discrepancy between desired number of children and th2 
number of children surviving under natural fertility. 
A significant part of Easterlin's contribution is conceptual: 
it places the available arguments concerning fertility decisions in a 
single framework. Yet it has theoretical and empirical implications. 
For example, Easterlin shows that a relationship between fertility 
level and household income is likely to have two components: one 
affecting the demand for children and the other affecting the supply; 
economists have neglected the supply side of this relationship. He 
shows that in a variety of circumstances a maximizing household will 
end up with more than its desired number of children--not because of 
bad luck or inefficiency but because fertility regulation costs some- 
thing. More unexpectedly, he.points out the considerable possibility 
of excess ,demand for children because of high mortality. That is an 
-.--- 
important result; it strengthens a weak point of the existing economic 
literature, ties together a number of historical observations concerning 
the impact of mortality changes on fertility, and helps explain not 
-. -- 
only the apparent resistance of many poor populations to reducing fer- 
tility, but also the occasional long-run - rise in fertility as incomes 
increase. 
In Easterlin's scheme, the major sources of change in 
fertility are changes in income, in the cost of children relative to 
gsods, in the cost of fertility regulation, and in tastes. The change 
in tastes, I think, poses the greatest difficulties. It is not clear 
why the taste for expensive consumer goods should grow faster than, 
say, the taste for highly-educated children. Easterlin theorizes that 
over a long period of rising incomes, each generation establishes a 
subsistence "floor" to its indifference curves below which no substi- 
tution of children for goods provides any satisfaction, and that as 
a consequence of forming its tastes in a period of rising welfare each 
gen'eration sets that floor higher than the previous one; but why 
shouldn't it work the other way round: a fertility floor below which 
people would rather starve than go childless? I suspect that the 
theory needs a greater emphasis on the direct costs and opportunity 
costs of children in terms of household labor. It needs more ample 
allowance for shifts in the labor-intensiveness of child care as a. 
result of.changes in the desired characteristics of offspring. It 
needs recognition that the extent to which having children insures the 
continuity of the household depends on how much employment is avail- 
able outside the household. 
E.A. Wrigley, "Fertility Strategy for the Individual and for 
the Group". The continuity of the household commands a major part,of. 
Wrigley's attention. His paper pursues two profound questions: How 
is it possible for a population to be self-regulating? How do varying 
mortality conditions affect the appropriate fertility strategy for the 
survival of the household, family, kin group or entire population? 
With respect to self-regulation, there is the possibility of individual 
or small-group rationality compounded by some mediating mechanism into 
the interest of the group as a whole; there is also the possibility of 
a large-group rationality which strongly constrains individuals and 
small groups but does not necessarily produce individual benefits for 
all of them. 
The rationality may be conscious or unconscious. Wrigley 
suggests that in the transition from preindustrial to industrial social 
organization, western populations moved from 1) an unconscious group 
rationality which tended to hold total population between the environ- 
ment's carrying capacity and the minimum size for survival to 2) a 
conscious individual rationality which gave no guarantee of an optimum 
for the population as a whole. In the preindustrial stage, the impor- 
tance of inheritance committed the individual to the family and the 
family to the community as a whole. But the advent of industrialism 
snapped rhe links, 
The bulk of Wrfgley's analysis deals with the impact of 
mortality on preindustrial problems. Via a set of model populations, 
he shows that under conditions of high mortality (roughly speaking, 
with a life expectancy at birth of less than forty years) the effort 
to produce a single surviving heir of a given sex will tend to result 
in very large completed family sizes, yet will frequently fail. In 
the hypothetical high-mortality populations under discussion, a 
significant minority of households will have more than one heir to 
provide for, bur a larger minority will have none at all. The situation 
provides strong incentives to high fertility. As mortality declines, 
however, the effect of a high-fertility strategy changes drastically. 
If the opportunities to be transmitted to the succeeding generation 
remain li:miced, a high-fertility strategy becomes disastrous at levels 
much above t.he threshold of forty years' life expectancy. The children 
have no place to go; the household is.stuck with them. 
Even in.prosperous western countries most populations have 
only passed the mortal.ity threshold in the last century or so. To the 
extenr thae they were, indeed, strongly.concerned about heirship, a 
large mino.rity of western households have probably been in a situation 
of excess demand for children through most of history. But other house- 
holds had coo many children. The balancing occyr-red through such insti- 
-- .- 
rutions as arranged marriage, farming out of excess children and 
temporary sharlng of housing. The essential institutions, Wrigley 
speculates, formed through an essentially evolutionary process: those 
groups which adopted them survived, while other groups destroyed them- 
selves through over- or under-population. However they formed, the 
instirutions constituted a group rationality which strongly constrained 
individual rationality. 
Amid these more general hypotheses, Wrigley throws out a series 
of observations on the specific mechanisms linking individual behavior 
to collective welfare. He points out that early marriage of sons 
whose fathers have died has very stringent limits as a survival strategy 
for a high-mortality population as a whole: the distribution of deaths 
is such that a large proportion of males will be too young to marry 
at the deaths of their fathers, while another large proportion will 
still have to live long years of celibate adulthood while their fathers 
are alive. The alternarive of a standard age of marriage will be 
costly, however, since it does not permit the matching of family 
formation to fluctuations in the availability of niches within the group. 
For example, as Wrigley observes, the rule that every couple should 
begin marriage in its own.dwelling implies either the tuning of 
marriage to variations in the housing supply or the maintenance of 
a housing stock larger than the population's average requirements, 
Temporary co-residence of households--especially the expectation 
that newlyweds will lodge with the parents of the bride or the 
groom--allows an escape from both alternatives. Thus a series of 
social arrangements which have often seemed traditional, and there- 
fore non-rational, begin to take on meaning as collective adaptations 
to poverty and high mortality. Among those social arrangements are 
many which provide incentives to high fertility. 
Despite the sureness of his steps, Wrigley's bold march 
through the past leaves questions strewn along the path. Explanations 
of social arrangements in terms of their functions or their survival 
value are notoriously hard to falsify; they turn easily to useless 
tautology. To take Wrigley's arguments concerning particular insti- 
tutions as a program for research requires an enormous cost-benefit 
analysis of historically existing arrangements and their theoretical 
alternatives or a grand comparfson of populations which survived with 
others which disappeared. Although Wrigley's analysis of the promotion 
of high fertility by high mortality is illuminating and persuasive for 
the hypothetical cases considered, it remains to match the models with 
historical instances and to determine what proportion of the total 
population was caught up in the grim contest among a relatively fixed 
set of local niches, deaths of occupants of those niches, and births 
to other occupants. In the case of Europe, we must ask whether the 
cities and wage-labor did not long offer an escape for the surplus 
-7- 
population: an escape to misery or death, perhaps, but an escape 
which increased the play in the local system. Like all really 
ef f ecti.ve theoretical enterprises, Wrigley ' s analysis increases the 
need for close observations to match the hypothetical relationships 
with the world which actually happened. 
Lutz Berkner and Franklin Mendels,.'.'Legal.Variables, Family 
Structure and Fertility in Western Europe". Berkner and Mendels want 
to trace the effects of inheritance customs--especially the degree of 
partibility--on nuptiality, migration and overall fertility level. 
Their paper complements Wrigley's, since it examines the character, 
extent and effectiveness of constraints which Wrigley's models take 
for granted. Since historians often argue that partible inheritance 
accelerates the fragmentation of holdings, the building up cf popula- 
tion pressure and general impoverishment of peasants, the paper also 
touches an important element in historical interpretations of change 
in the western countryside. 
Like Wrigley, Berkner and Mendels assume that people would 
generally rather marry locally than emigrate or remain single. More 
so than Wrigley, they assume that the variations in nuptiality which 
accompany different inheritance systems significantly affect the 
associated levels of fertility. Much more than Wrigley, they inquire 
into the conditions promoting the appearance of diverse forms of 
compound household, They conclude that the tendency of partibilfty 
to promote fragmentation of holdings is genuine but weak, and that 
inheritance arrangements have.relatively strong, direct effects,on 
household composition. Partibility does not have the devastating 
divisive effects which simple arithmetic leads us to anticipate because 
local endogamy tends to reconsolidate fragmented holdings, because 
much of the land peasants work is leased rather than owned, because 
under high mortality there are few surviving heirs, and.because the 
principals involved often go to great lengths to avoid subdividing 
holdings which are already at the minimum required to support a 
household. 
This last observation involves fertility and strategies of 
heirship most directly. Berkner and Mendels conclude that in.western 
Europe a strong pressure for preferential partibility grew up-- 
regardless of the legal and customary~constraints--wherever the main- 
tenance of intact holdings was important to the welfare of succeeding 
generations. The preference could operate through enforced celibacy 
of some children remaining on the land (see Bourdieu 1962), through 
preferential marriage or through out-migration of "surplus" children, 
- 
but in one way or another it required that.some potential heirs 
modify their rightful claims. Because all of these arrangements were 
costly, peasant households working within any inheritance system had 
a strong incentive to restrict births once they had the desired 
complement of heirs. 
Berkner and Mendels check out some of the implied relationships 
via a- straight£ orward cross-sectional regression analysis of character- 
istics of French departements in 1856. It reveals the expected asso- 
ciation between impartible inheritance and complex households, between. 
impartible inheritance and high marital fertility, between impartibility 
and out-migration, between partibility and female nuptiality, as well 
as the negative associations between farm fragmentation and both house- 
hold complexity and female nuptiality. As Berkner and Mendels say, 
-./- - 
relationships estimated at such a high level of aggregatiorcannot 
clinch the case; they simply provi'de- the.warrant for further investi- 
gation of the same hypotheses. The major contribution of their work 
is its portrayal of inheritance arrangements, marital fertility, 
migration and household composition as mutually dependent parts of a 
general effort to assure the continuity of peasant households and 
families. 
Ronald Lee, "Models of Preindustrial Population Dynamics". 
Lee's major effort goes into formulating, estimating, and testing 
simple but precise models of preindustrial population control systems, 
At the request of other members of the seminar, Lee includes a more 
extensive nethodological discussion--especially concerning the logic 
of cross-spectral analysis--than he would ordinarily address to fellow 
econometricians. The central models state the alternative relation- 
ships among temporary fluctuations in wages, mortality, nuptiality, 
fertility and total population. They begin with wages and mortality 
exogenous.to the system, then successively incorporate them into the 
system. 
The main arguments Lee considers are fairly straightforward: 
diminishing returns to labor, mortality change as a determinant both 
of wages and of population size, fluctuations in marriages as the. 
chief source of fluctbations in births, and so on. To be more exact, 
Lee consistently examines both such general arguments and the main 
alternatives to them; his method is frequently to define a parameter 
whose various possible values correspond to competing arguments, then 
to estimate the.parameter with the best time-series data available. 
The best data are often not very good, so that Lee leaves up to us 
. - -  
whether to regard the estimates as solid evidence or as proposals for 
more detailed research., Even with superb data, the estimation and 
testing of these apparently straightforward hypotheses would be eompli- 
cated; some of Lee's most valuable observations concern the effects 
of varying assumptions built into the models. For example, he shows 
that "an observed positive association of mortality and wages is quite 
consistent with a negative structural relation between the two, pro- 
vided that the independent variation of mortality is considerably 
greater than that of wages." 
Both the theoretical results and the empirical ones comment 
effectively on available ideas concerning historical fluctuations in 
fertility. 0n.the theoretical side, Lee demonstrates that even in 
principle changing nuptiality can only be a weak, partial determinant 
of fertility fluctuations. The fact that they frequently covary 
closely results, in his view, from that they - both responded to the 
changes in opportunity represented in his models by real wages. (Lee 
does not deny any relationship between nuptiality and fertility; he 
regards the characteristic marriage pattern as strongly affecting a 
population's average fertility.) 
On the empirical side, he finds evidence that fluctuations 
in wages and mortality are negatively related in the short run, and 
positively related in the long run. The finding is consistent with 
the idea that death rates rise in times of hardship, but that over a 
longer run the labor shortage induced by high mortality levels tends 
to push the wages up. His estimates also suggest that the demand 
for labor in England was relatively constant from the thirteenth to 
the seventeenth century, but began shifting upward, and significantly 
a f  f  e c t i n g  t h e  .whole- popula t ion  c o n t r o l '  system, i n  t h e  e igh teen th .  He 
cau t ious ly -  'proposes! t h a t  t h e  s h i f t  marks- the' movement from ' soc i a l  ' 
.am-angements - wh4ch st.abili 'i&l the:, r e t u r n .  t o '  l a b o r  bu t  were vu lne rab le  
. . 
t o  .exogenous :f-luctuations .in., n i o r t a l i t y  , i n t o  - s o c i a l  -arrangements - . 
broadly  cor-responding :to.the'..supply-demand in te rdependence-of  wa-ges 
and l a b o r  envisaged- 'by t h e  c l a s s i c a l  econ'omists.' - . . . 
. Clea r ly  .the work does n o t ' e n d  - there .  .Lee. ' s , inquiry l e a d s  ' in  
t h r e e  - important  . .dir&ctionk:  ::-: tbhai-d th'e" coinfiilation-.of'.mb=e.' And '." -, 
b e t t e r  s e r i e s . .  s u i t a b l e  . f o r  t h e  .es t imat ion  and,, t e s t i n g  of .the .sAxie. '' 
models; -toward.. t he  c l e a r i n g  ' up- of uncer ta in tdes . ,  - ' a b i g u i t i e s  and . 
c o n f l i c t s  i n .  t he .  f i n d i n g s ;  toward.; the.-deliberate.'pursuit ' of t h e  
many sdggest.ions'~Lee- throws '-off a lbng  the-way:: It . a l so  s t a n d s  a s  a  
s t r o n g  i n j u n c t i o n '  to+qmodel . t h e . : r e l a t i o n s  surroundfng f  e r t i l i t ) ;  very  
c a r e f u l l y  -,b&ore plunging . i n t o  s tat is  t k a l  a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h e  'purpose 
. - . . . ,. . . . of estdmating. . those r e l a t i o n s .  .. . 
Maris --Vinovskis : " F e r t i l i t y ' . ~ i f f  e r e n t i a l s  'among 'Massachusetts 
Towns. :and Regionsrdn (1860" ; -'.'Matis : ~ i n o i r s k i s  fo l lows  a  somewhat ' .* 
d i f f e r e n t  philosophy. - H i s  l a r g e  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  b e g i n s -  ' 
with  a subs t an t i ' a l  .list :of % variab1e.s  each -of which has  - an a-rguable 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  fertility'differentials, p u t s  a  g r e a t  d e a l  of 
e f f o r t  i n t o  t h e  measurement of ' those tv 'a r iab les  'over  a se' t  of 
geographic u n i t s ,  andsthen .employs. an' ex t ens ive  s t a t i s t i c a l  procedure 
t o  s ea rch  f o r - s t r o n g ,  p e r s i s t e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The approach i s  " 
much less deduct ive  than. Lee,'s, and probably  more vu lne rab le  t o  ,- 
spur ious  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of . t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  r e s u l t s .  Vinovskis 
reduces t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of spu r ious  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  by be ing  exceed- 
i n g l y  c a r e f u l  i n  a t t a c h i n g  meaning t o  t h e  estimated.relationships. 
Massachusetts and the United States have been somewhat 
neglected in general discussions of the demographic transition; they 
were, after all, major cases of early fertility decline. As Vinovskis 
shows in his preliminary sketch, Massachusetts was generally the 
lowest-fertility state of the U.S. during the first half of the 
nineteenth century; in each of the three Massachusetts regions he 
distinguishes, a.sharp fertility decline was already underway by 1810 
and continued unabated to 1850. A large part of the paper goes into 
portraying the regional trends in the first half of the century, and 
. &--C---- 
in providing both backgrounds and justification for the individual 
variables to be.employed:in the statistical analysis. 
The multivariate analysis itself compares Massachusetts towns 
and regions in 1860, a year for which exceptionally rich census data 
are available at the local level. Using a stepwiie regression pro- 
cedure which follows a variance-reduction criterion, it estimates the 
association of fifteen .variables with the white refined fertility 
. - 
ratio. At the statewide level, 1ower.fertility is most strongly 
associated with a.low sex ratio, a low proportion Irish, a large town 
population, high commercialization, a low proportion in farming and a 
low level of schooling. Some of these may simply represent regional 
effects, since the associations greatly weaken within regions; that 
is notably true of town size and proportion in farming. Nevertheless, 
the overall pattern is consistent with arguments which associate low 
fertility with involvement in urban-industrial-commercial life. The 
obvious next step is to model the relationships more explicitly and 
. -..- 
tightly, then to estimate and test the models. 
Etienne van de Walle, "The French Fertility Decline until 
1850". If Lee's paper displays. the special strengths of the econo- 
metrician who.is capable of stating and verifying his arguments 
precisely, and Vinovskis' paper the virtues of the historian who 
- . .  
knows his site, van de wallets paper exemplifies the comparative 
advantage of the demographer. His study of France belongs to a 
massive series of studies of the European fertility decline 
initiated by Ansley Coale. Van de Walle has *reported the general 
procedures and findings in a recent monograph.   ere he takes the 
massive technical and substantive results of that largely descrip- 
tive work for granted, and pushes on to a.preliminary survey of 
explanations for the great demographic changes in a nineteenth- 
century France. 
The discussion acknowledges the possible significance of 
inheritance customs, changing employment opportunities and other 
variables the papers in this book single out for attention. But 
it emphasizes the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge, and the 
decline of moral opposition to contraceptive practice. The 
diffusion process, in van de Walle's view, probably began iith 
the eighteenth-century elite, and moved steadily down the hierarchy 
of class. Partly because he is dealing with large aggregates (in 
the nineteenth century the average French department had close to 
half a million people) and partly because even at the aggregate 
level he' lacks convincing measures of the relevant communications 
flows, van de Walle is not able to carry the diffusion explanation 
to a direct test. Instead, he carries out a simple but extensive 
correlational analysis of associations of fertility level with . 
various indicators of social structure over all but the most urban 
departments at numerous census years,from 1801 to 1851. Although 
each of the statistical analyses is cross-sectional, van de Walle 
fortifies his interpretations by looking at lagged relationships 
and examining the changing pattern of relationships over time. 
The analysis reveals substantial and persistent relation- 
ships between low fertility and lack of out-migration, high levels 
of wealth, high nuptiality, and low mortality. Van de Walle inter- 
prets the findings as showing a lag of mortality on fertility rather 
than the other way round, and prefers the conclusion that both 
respond to some third set of variables. That interpretation may hold 
for the crude birth rates, but the analysis of the standardized 
fertility ratio appears to produce results consistent with a lag of 
fertility on mortality. The findings as a whole fall into the sort 
of pattern predicted by population-pressure arguments such as Dov 
Friedlander's. It will take both multivariate modeling of the 
relationships and their examination at a smaller scale than the 
department to tell us whether the resemblance is more than superficial. 
Rudolf Braun, "Early Industrialization and Demographic Changes 
in the Canton of Zurich". The final essay in our set does not under- 
take the explicit multivariate modeling, but it does bring down the 
scale of analysis very effectively . Braun examines the uplands behind 
Zurich during the time when the city was.becoming the center of an 
important network of rural and small-town industry. Like Vinovskis 
and van de Walle, Braun emphasizes the complexity of the processes he 
is portraying. But this time the complexity is historical and cultural: 
. - 
Braun;wants us to understand how the. specific institutions of landholding, 
community membership, deployment of labor and so forth affected the 
responses of local populations to changing opportunities. 
The contrast between peasants and proletarians in the Zurich 
region is a case study in collective vs. indivfdual controls over 
fertility. For example, Braun shows that the lowland peasant 
communities legally imposed a numerus clausus: a fixed number of 
households permitted to live within their confines. That is an 
extreme (but not unique) version of the inelastic supply of niches 
which figures so importantly in Wrigley's arguments. Again, Braun 
argues explicitly that as industry spread through the uplands inher- 
itance customs shifted significantly and people began taking advantage 
of the "entirely new possibilities of marriage and founding a house- 
hold. " 
. In consonance with other studies of rural industry in Europe, 
Braun shows the great rise in population densities as the previously 
marginal agricultural areas in the uplands turned to textile 
production in the eighteenth century. ~lthough the .direct demographic 
evidence is thin, Braun makes a good case for two related developments: 
- 
the slowing of out-migration and the rise of nuptiality. He emphasizes 
the role of declining age at marriage in a presumed general rise of 
fertility. The evidence at hand, however, does not allow him to make 
a sure distinction between the effects of changes in nuptiality and 
changes in marital fertility. 
In terms of Easterlin's setting of the problem, there are some 
intriguing indications that the relative cost of children actually 
declined as industry expanded and the possibilities of remunerative 
employment for youngsters proliferated inside and outside the household. 
Braun h i n t s  t h a t  a t  rimes t h e r e  was even a p o s i t i v e  economic incen r fve  
t o  breed c h i l d r e n  f o r  t h e  wages they brought i n .  Although concempo- 
r a r i e s  regarded t h e  apparent  i n c r e a s e  of nonmar i ta l  s exua l  a c t i v i t y  
a s  evidence of t h e  moral decay brought about  by economic change, Braun's 
obse rva t ions  r a i s e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  r e l a t i v e  cos t  of 
having chf ldren- - ins ide  o r  o u t s i d e  of marriage--played i t s  p a r t ,  
Braun's a n a l y s i s  b r ings  out  t h e  way changes i n  family s t r u c t u r e  
and f e r t i l i t y  behavior can occur  rhrough t h e  expansion and adap ta t ion  
of we l l - e s t ab l i shed  i n s r i r u t i o n a l  forms i n s t e a d  of a sharp  r e j e c t i o n  of 
t h e  o ld  ways. One example i s  t h e  widened u s e  of t h e  o ld  i n s t i t u t i o n  
of bundling--zu -- Lich t  gehen--as t h e  &ontext  f o r  p r e m a r i t a l  sexual  
exper ience ,  Another i s  t h e  expansion of RastgebenIRastnehmen, an 
arrangement which o r i g i n a l l y  s e t  t h e  quota  f o r  t h e  c h i l d ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
of l abo r  co t h e  household, By ex tens ion ,  t h e  convent iona l  p r i c e  of 
t h a t  l a b o r  s e t  t h e  r e t u r n  p a r e n t s  expected from ano the r  houkeh'old t o  
which they  farmed o u t  a s u r p l u s  c h i l d ,  F i n a l l y  i t  came t o  be t h e  
amount a c h i l d  owed t h e  p a r e n t s  from wages earned elsewhere.  I n  
Braun's a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  evo lu t ion  of Rast l e d  t o  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which 
t h e  c h i l d ' s  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  t h e  household of o r i g i n  dwindled t o  t h a t  
s i n g l e  customary payment, i n  r e t u r n  f o r  which t h e . c h i l d  was f r e e  r o  
d ispose  of h i s  t ime, person and remaining wages, I f  t h a t  is  c o r r e c t ,  
Braun has  f d e n t i f i e d  one of t h e  major mechanisms by which t h e  expansion 
of wage l a b o r  promotes n u p t i a l i t y  and t h e  es tab l i shment  of nuc lea r  
fami ly  households.  
The Papers  a s  a Whole 
My summaries of t h e s e  r i c h ,  v a r i e d  e s says  are no s u b s t i t u t e s  
f o r  t h e  papers  themselves.  Never the less  they  s u f f i c e  t o  show t h a t  
multiple analytic styles are competing for attention in historical 
studies of fertility and to identify some of the gaps and inconsis- 
tencies in the literature. Two kinds of analysis which are prominent 
in the literature are not directly represented in our collection: the 
broad, discursive treatment of major population trends and the 
preparation of demographic estimates for small populations via some 
type of collective biography. (That is not because this group rejects 
those ways of dealing with demographic problems; Easterlin, for example, 
has written a number of broad interpretations of American population 
history, Wrigley is one of the pioneers of family reconstitutions, and 
each of the other contributors has several styles of analysis at his 
command. ) 
In retrospect, it is especially disappointing that none of the 
essays directly reports work in collective biography. Family reconsti- 
tution and related procedures are absorbing a great deal of energy, 
producing important results and posing urgent technical and logical 
questions for the field. At the center of the difficulty is the effort 
to arrive at estimates of vital characteristics of large, whole 
populations through the tracing of those individuals or families within 
smaller populations--such as single villages--who remain in place and 
visible. At the present stage, any of three outcomes seems possible: 
1) the development of record-linkage procedures which are sufficiently 
capacious and accurate to permit the tracing of large, mobile popula- 
tions, 2) the development of means for detecting, estimating and 
correcting the biases and uncertainties introduced by reliance on 
different kinds of subpopulations, 3) a shift away from the effort to 
estimate general demographic parameters to the analysis of differ- 
entials within well-enumerated populations. Our papers do not 
explicitly address these choices. 
With that important exception, the essays raise all the major 
current issues in the historical study of vital.processes. Some 
questions recur over and over: how much preindustrial populations 
were self-regulafing, and how; what determines the alternative responses 
to population pressure; to what extent the forms of urbanization, 
industrialization and commercialization which prevailed before the 
growth of large-scale industry had reliable effects on nuptiality and 
fertility; the loci and mechanisms of the,long-run fertility decline. 
in western countries; the demographic processes involved in the trans- 
formation of populations from agrarian to urban-industrial. 
Despite great variation in the relative weights attributed to 
tastes, costs and income, the papers as a whole substantiate the utility 
of Easterlin's categories for the analysis of the western fertility 
decline. The major difficulties, I think, are two: first, that 
Easterlin's formulation seems to assume that a couple are making decisions 
with a view to their own present resources and future satisfactions, 
whereas we have encountered a number of cases where a household or a 
kin group appears to make collective decisions with respect to its own 
continuity or the welfare of its senior members; second, that children 
are a potential source of income as well as a good to be consumed. The 
difficulties are not insuperable. Yet how they are met will signifi- 
cantly affect our ability to connect contemporary analyses of fertility 
decisions with historical studies of changing fertility. 
Taken together, the papers offer an interesting commentary 
on the economic theory of fertility. The hesitations concerning 
Easterlin's formulation just mentioned apply to the economic treat- 
ment as a whole. While the decisions of couples in the light of 
the costs and benefits of.children .to them are a reasonable starting 
point, with respect to the problems which show up in our papers the 
existing literature gives too little place to returns from children 
other than the satisfactions to be gained from direct interaction 
with them and from vicarious participation in their accomplishments, 
and to the participation of compound households, kin groups and 
communities in the crucial decisions. We may admire the humanity of 
economists wh& emphasize the pleasure children provide; in addition 
to pleasure we need room for the incentives of pensions, patrimony 
and pecuniary return. 
our authors are uncertain of the value of "natural fertility" 
as a 'foil for the .analysis of actual fertility. Yet they implicitly 
provide strong support for Easterlin's proposal to integrate the supply 
side into models.of -household fertility decisions. There is some 
division of opinion about how to do it. Easterlin proposes to sum up 
the essential processes through the relationship between natural and 
desired fertility in combination with the cost of fertility regulation. 
Wrigley, Braun, Berkner and Mendels, on the other hand,,call attention 
to the collective controls over opportunities to marry and to engage 
in intercourse; the collective controls are awkward to handle either 
as constraints on natural fertility or as costs of fertility regulation; 
they may well have to be modeled separately. Lee, for his part, raises 
doubts that varying access to marriage is a significant regulator of 
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changing general attitudes toward children, and so on. The papers 
(even Braun's, which makes the most of the changes in life style 
associated with industrial activity) stress continuities in the 
fundamental behavior patterns behind varying levels of fertility. 
In that regard, they minimize the importance of ideological 
and attitudinal changes as prerequisites of the fertility decline. 
To take one small instance, Easterlin suggests in passing that the 
concomitance of changes in marital and non-marital fertility need 
not count as evidence against household-economic arguments: it is 
likely that fertility-control innovations originate and become 
widely available in response to demand from married couples, but 
once available help the unmarried to restrict births as well. The 
demand for fertility control among the unmarried is already high 
but inef,fective;, when it becomes high and effective among the married, 
the unmarried also benefit. 
More generally, the papers lead to the conclusion that the 
"demographic transition" is simply.one of several competing theories 
about the usual demographic effects of large. increases in per capita 
income. ' In Easterlin' s neat summary, the fundamental variables are: 
demand for children, as outcome of 
a. tastes. 
b, income . 
. c. prices ' 
2. potential supply of children, as outcome of 
- .  
a, natural fertility 
b, survival prospects 
3. costs of fertility regulation 
a, subjecrive 
b, market 
In his argument, the three sets co-determine actual fertility. All 
three clusters of variables surely shift as large changes in per 
capita income occur, If important alterations in health conditions 
occur, either exogenously or as an indirect consequence of income 
changes, both components of the potential supply of children should 
alter as well. 
The regularities within such a system may be very great. Yet 
there is no reason to think that the changes have to be highly synchro- 
nized. There is no reason to expect an invariant sequence running from 
high, varfbale mortality and fertility to low, invariable mortality and 
fertflity via a transition in which mortality decline leads the way, 
One of Easterlin's competitors to the demographic-transition model has 
f ertilicy responding strongly and early to economic growth, thereby 
producing a substantial rise in actual fertility. ~ee's analysis of 
eighteenth-century England contains the nucleus of a theory featuring 
moreality changes and shifting demand for labor. Instead of seeking 
general explanations for "the" demographic transition, the papers 
suggest, we should consider the demographic-transition idea one of the 
several available theories concerning the dynamics of large-scale demo- 
graphic transformations. 
One of the possibilities which arises from the discussion in 
this book is a sequence running from peasant society to proletarianization 
to embourgeoisement; in such a hypothetical sequence, peasant social 
arrangements effectively tune fertility to mortality, but restrict it 
-23-. 
nonetheless. Proletarianization tends to raise fertility. But the 
acquisition of.property and the investment in children's futures among 
all classes of the population, in this argument, checks fertility 
more decisively than ever before. To the extent that proletarianization 
is the dominant process we should not be surprised to find fertility 
remaining high as "modernization" proceeds. In this version, the 
fertility side of the demographic transition traces the expansion of 
capitalism from western Europe.to the rest of the .world. 
I do not say that my co-authors make such an argument. I 
simply say that their own analyses make such an argument plausible. 
Their general teaching is this : the search for recurrent sequences 
may make some historical sense and may be of some heuristic use, but 
is an unprofitable way to go about building general explanations of 
fertility change. From this point of view, the most valuable historical 
analyses isolate the relationships among the variables involved in well- 
documented instances of shifts in,fertility. The essays in this book 
show that available historical evidence can, indeed; help us to assess 
the validity of general explanations of demographic change. 

